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My generation of 50-ish German lawyers has come of age under the impression
that the USA has something essential to teach us: how to seek and find answers
to legal questions without having to pretend that they are already dictated by the
inherent reason of law itself. How to acknowledge the political, economic and
social framework of law, the possibility of diverse opinions and interests, the fruitful
political dynamics of the conflict between majorities and minorities. How to think of
democracy and the rule of law as reciprocal conditionalities. How to do law in a non-
authoritarian way. Law in context, critical legal studies, law and economics – you
could learn that at Yale, in New York and in Chicago, and those who didn’t manage
to go there and do an LL.M. or PhD degree, like me, at least had people like Oliver
Lepsius or Christoph Möllers who had and could tell what they had learnt.
Now, one might think, things seem to be changing. Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, the
former Bundesverfassungsgericht judge known for the crystalline sharpness of her
dissenting opinions, calls the US Supreme Court in a FAZ op-ed without much ado
a “dysfunctional court”: too much politics, too little reason. Criminal law professor
Tonio Walter, also in the FAZ (October 7, 2020, p. N3, not online as far as I can
see), praises Antonin Scalia’s textualism, of all features of US jurisprudence, as an
exemplary “method of limiting interpretation”. So this is the best the USA have to
offer us now? Does the German legal culture, based on learned textual exegesis,
abstraction and the scientific-discursive search for truth, prove to be superior to the
once so fascinating Anglo-Saxon openness in these times of crisis?
We Germans generally are very much enjoying ourselves right now, relatively
speaking. This is hardly surprising, given Germany’s current stability, in contrast to
the epochal crisis which not only the United States but also the British motherland
of common law are currently facing. We wouldn’t allow ourselves to indulge in
any self-satisfied backslapping uncritically, of course. This week, we have started
an online symposium on whether or not a “German legal hegemony” exists in
the European Union, on the initiative of ARMIN VON BOGDANDY. He raises the
hegemony question, on the one hand, with a view to the infamous PSPP ruling
of the German Federal Constitutional Court and the impression of a German
doctrinaire encroachment into the domain of European law, but on the other hand
also with respect to the critics of this decision – including explicitly Verfassungsblog
itself: Do we embody “an enlightened, soft neo-liberalism that is then imposed
particularly on Central and Eastern European countries”? Are we guilty of “promoting
Germanization”?
According to BOGDAN IANCU, we are. The symposium includes a large number
of articles extremely worth reading, but I would particularly highlight Iancu’s
contribution. In his view, for the past decade “the mainstream liberal discourse, also
on the Verfassungsblog, has consisted in the incantation of one mantra: ‘populists’
are destroying ‘the rule of law’.” He sees a “rule-of-law ideology” at work that serves
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to make invisible the social, political, and economic inequalities along with their
liberal-urban profiteers in the Central and Eastern European countries concerned.
EU accession, the Copenhagen criteria and the entire rule-of-law monitoring
business are little more than a help- and fruitless attempt to prop up something
like the appearance of the rule of law: Oh, everything goes swimmingly in Bulgaria,
never mind if the omnipotent Attorney General keeps hounding adversaries of the




Momentum Digital: Solidarität oder gemeinsame Verantwortungslosigkeit? Der
Vorschlag zum EU-Migrationspakt auf dem Prüfstand
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20. Oktober 2020, 18:00 – 19:30 Uhr (via Zoom / Livestream)
Ende September 2020 stellte die Europäische Kommission ihren Vorschlag für
einen neuen EU-Migrationspakt vor. Über die im Entwurf enthaltenen Neuerungen,
alternative Vorschläge und über die Hintergründe der Verhandlungen diskutieren
in diesem MPIL Momentum Dana Schmalz, Catharina Ziebritzki und Christian
Jakob. Details und Anmeldung hier.
++++++++++++++++++++++
The question to what extent Bogdan Iancu’s accusation hits Germany in particular,
and more specifically Verfassungsblog, aside: I think he has a point.
The rule-of-law discourse turns into an ideology when it is used to blur and make
invisible political conflicts of interest. This is the opposite of what the rule of law in a
democracy is for: to keep the coexistence of political opposites possible. To keep it
possible to have different opinions and interests, to argue, to compromise, to vote
and to reach collectively binding decisions. To keep pluralism possible, by means of
legal procedures and institutions.
If populism means that “ordinary people” should get a larger piece of the cake: I’m
all for it. Redistribution is populist? Wonderful, keep it coming. My problem with
authoritarian populism is not so much the populist part, but the authoritarian part:
that it equates the “ordinary people” with the “real people”. That it fuels its political
engine with the very legal procedures and institutions which keep politics functional.
That in doing so it not only reduces the law to dust and ashes, but also politics.
The hallmark of the rule of law is not necessarily that courts are maximally and
radically independent from politics. The very term “rule of law” makes it clear that it
is just that: rule, and thus as such in need of legitimation. You don’t have to stand
trial to know what it means to be subject to the power of those black-robed people up
there. Who are they, anyway? This is a question every court has to put up with.
In Germany, the resounding answer is: the state. The Rechtsstaat! It is he who
reigns supreme in his palace of justice, all robe, not man, and woe betide the judge
who lets her colorful headscarf reveal her Muslim personality under that imposing
Recht-Staat persona!
The American answer is much more open, unmasked, unprotected: They have been
elected.
For all the undeniable problems the USA are facing at the moment: I don’t think it’s
settled yet which answer is better.
I rather wonder whether a better explanation for the current contrast between
German stability and Anglo-Saxon misery may be found elsewhere entirely. In Article
79 (2) of the Grundgesetz, for example. It requires a two-thirds majority in both
chambers of parliament for constitutional amendments, a threshold low enough
to keep fixing constitutional shortcomings a possibility in general but, at the same
time, high enough to keep that power out of reach for the respective winner of the
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election. This seems to me to be one of the truly beneficial features of the German
constitutional order. In the US, constitutional amendments are too hard, in the UK
too easy to achieve. How would both fare if they had an amendment rule like that?
The week on Verfassungsblog
Talking about headscarves: In Berlin, a directive issued by the President of the
Superior Court of Justice to allow Muslim trainee lawyers (Rechtsreferendare)
acting as public prosecutors to wear a hijab in court has caused a dispute. The
staff representatives believe they are allowed to ignore this regulation, among other
things because it was not enacted as law. KLAUS FERDINAND GÄRDITZ provides
constitutional education: A formal law is necessary to restrict the freedom of a
fundamental right holder, but not to spare him/her that restriction.
This week’s episode of our podcast “We need to talk about the Rule of Law“,
which we are organizing together with the German bar association DAV, also
was focussing on the judiciary, and more specifically on disciplinary proceedings
and their abuse by authoritarian regimes, the case in point obviously once again
being Poland. How to solve the dilemma of keeping the abuse of judicial power
sanctionable without abusing this sanctioning power itself was the topic of my
discussion with three distinguished guests from Slovenia, Spain and Poland: NINA
BETETTO, ADAM BODNAR and SUSANA DE LA SIERRA.
Wojciech Sadurski, the constitutionalist and law professor well known to all readers
of Verfassungsblog, is currently experiencing first-hand how far Poland has strayed
from the path of the rule of law. Last week, the defamation lawsuit brought against
him by TVP, a public television station controlled by the ruling PiS party, was heard
in a Warsaw court. JOHN MORIJN quotes Sadurski’s statement in court – highly
recommended reading.
The European Court of Justice has issued a verdict on Hungary’s “Lex CEU” which,
unsurprisingly, was found incompatible with EU law and in particular with the right
to academic freedom. RENÁTA UITZ points out that Orbán is no longer caught
unprepared by infringement judgments from Luxembourg, with his own constitutional
court ready to use the Hungarian “constitutional identity” to tailor the binding effect of
European law to his needs.
On the same day, a new ruling on data retention was handed down in Luxembourg,
which clarifies that data retention without cause is incompatible with European
fundamental rights, with some exceptions such as the fight against terrorism. As a
politician, SABINE LEUTHEUSSER-SCHNARRENBERGER has worked hard to
stop data retention and is accordingly satisfied with the judgement.
TRISTAN RADTKE writes on a problem which also has to do with data protection:
the mining of data on the contract period of customers of electricity and gas suppliers
with the aim of identifying customers who are willing to switch – a practice which
calls for legislative action.
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The UN Tribunal for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia is facing closure after the
proceedings against the defendant Ao An were dropped. MALTE STEDTNITZ
examines the causes and consequences.
AMAL SETHI and PRANNV DHAWAN focus on a current democracy problem in
India, posed by the speakers of parliament who help the ruling Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) to push through its anti-democratic agendas.
So much for this week.
Please do not forget to support us on Steady (or else via
paypal@verfassungsblog.de or bank transfer, IBAN DE41 1001 0010 0923 7441 03,
BIC PBNKDEFF)!
All best,
Max Steinbeis
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